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1. Introduction
In economics, it is customary to develop formal models of imaginary worlds based on assumptions 
that may have remote connection with the economic reality. It is not unusual to hear, for example, 
in a seminar presentation that “My model is not intended to be realistic, but only to demonstrate the 
potential for a particular outcome”. When someone suggests that an economic assumption within 
the model is absurd, they are told that they do not understand economics. “Have you ever read Friedman’s 
essay on positive economics?” the model builder would ask. “Well, if you do, you will understand that 
the realism of an assumption does not matter”. This intellectual attitude illustrates the typical reac-
tion of the rational expectations economists when confronted with questions about the empirical 
existence of omniscient economic agents.
In his famous essay, “The methodology of positive economics”, Friedman (1953) conveyed an influ-
ential message to the economics profession: the existence of unrealistic assumptions within a model 
is not a valid reason for the rejection of the model. It has long been recognized that the Friedman’s 
(1953) essay on economic methodology (or F53, for short) displays open-ended unclarities. For exam-
ple, the notion of “unrealistic assumption” plays a role of absolutely fundamental importance in his 
methodological framework, but the term itself was never unambiguously defined in any of the Friedman’s 
contributions to the economics discipline.1 As a result, Friedman’s methodology of positive econom-
ics is appealing and liberating because the choice of premises in economic theorizing is not subject 
to any constraints concerning the degree of realisticness (or unrealisticness) of the assumptions.
Concerns about the use of unrealistic assumptions are not new. Well before the publication of F53, 
Fredrick A. Hayek emphasized that “to assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind … is to 
assume the problem away and to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real 
world” (Hayek, 1945, p. 530). The early 1970s witnessed criticisms on F53 from several prominent 
economists, including Frisch (1970), Leontief (1970) and Brown (1972). Or, to add one more exam-
ple which by no means exhausts the list of early criticisms, James Tobin expressed that the Friedman’s 
methodology of positive economics “has done great damage” (Klamer, 1984, p. 105). It is true that Tobin’s 
reaction against Friedman’s methodology was unambiguous: “My reaction is that we are not so 
good at testing hypotheses so that we can give up any information we have at whatever stage of the 
argument. The realism of the assumptions does matter. Any evidence you have on that, either cas-
ual or empirical, is relevant” (Klamer, 1984, p. 106). But, it is true also that Tobin did not articulate 
any convincing criticism of the Friedman’s methodology.
As the foregoing illustrates, the economics discipline has some methodological tensions condu-
cive to strong disagreements between economists of high reputation. Unfortunately, the disputes of 
earlier decades about the realism of the assumptions in economics have not been completely resolved. 
This can be easily verified by inspection of the papers in the book edited by Mäki (2009a). The debate 
on Friedman’s methodology and the methodology of F53 is far from over.2
An obvious point to make is as follows. The methodology of F53 maintains that the realism of the 
assumptions is irrelevant, but it does not offer an operational definition of either realistic or unreal-
istic assumption. Consequently, it is not nonsensical to infer that this methodological stance allows 
assumptions involving economic agents endowed with attributes that cannot be found in any real 
human being. A case in point is the conventional assuming of omniscient economic agents. The 
agents in question are able to instantaneously understand the available information, and for them, 
all the implications of any propositions are obvious. This brings us naturally to an awkward theme: 
the line of separation between economics and science fiction.
Science fiction is a field of imaginary enquiry that covers several disparate subfields. A grand view 
on this vast intellectual field can be found in Sterling (2013). For the sake of concreteness, we confine 
attention to a proper subfield, namely scientific or technological narrative based on imaginary 
worlds that do not exist but they render impossible things possible. The essential distinguishing 
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exist at the time the story is imagined. Examples of fictional elements included in this form of narra-
tive abound: humans travelling close to the speed of light, teleportation, androids with conscious 
and purchase of desirable memories are a few.
Logical inference is typically used in science fiction to answer formidable questions—such as time 
travelling—but other forms of creative thinking (e.g. lateral thinking, imaginary thinking and soph-
isms) are not excluded. For example, the physicist and cosmologist Hawking (2010) asks: Is time travel 
to the future possible within the laws of nature? To answer this, question Hawking postulates the exist-
ence of a super-fast train able to travel close to the speed of light (186,000 miles per second) and 
circling the Earth over and over again. Then, using logical inference, Hawking shows that one week 
in the super-fast train implies a hundred years into the future. Not surprisingly, Hawking points out 
that there is no train on Earth that could reach such a speed.
In reviewing the literature on the realism of the assumptions, we have uncovered a significant 
work that tacitly suggests a possible point of contact between economics and science fiction: Facts 
and Fiction in Economics, edited by Mäki (2002a). However, the question, “Is the intersection between 
the economics discipline and science fiction empty?” is never asked. It is not difficult to offer tenta-
tive reasons for this neglect. For example, the economics profession in general is not interested in the 
answer; or the question seems whimsical; or there is no universally accepted definition of science fic-
tion and so on.
It should hardly be necessary to mention that the use of models of imaginary worlds involving 
unrealistic assumptions does not of itself prove that there exists a non-empty intersection between 
economics and science fiction. Economic models are designed to abstract essential features of com-
plex reality, and thereby, they deal with simplified, imaginary worlds. Notwithstanding, the question 
“Does the methodology of positive economics prevent the overlapping between economics and sci-
ence fiction?” comes very naturally.
In this paper, we show the following theorem: The methodology of positive economics does not 
exclude science fiction. This theorem is a positive statement, and consequently, it does not involve 
value judgements. However, it throws a wrench on the formulation of economic policy based on sur-
real models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly mention the existence of different interpre-
tations of F53. Section 3 gives a precise definition of the notion of surreal economic model. Section 4 
proves a logical conclusion emerging from the methodology of F53, illustrates the result and points out 
a riddle concerning the use of surreal models for practical policy purposes. Section 5 proffers a solution 
to eliminate a possible point of contact between economics and science fiction. Section 6 offers sum-
mary and concluding remarks.
2. The Friedman tenet
The first essay written by Milton Friedman on economic methodology was a critical review of Oskar 
Lange’s Price Flexibility and Employment. Friedman (1946) emphasized the crucial role of prediction 
in economic theorizing:
The basic sources of the defects in Lange’s theoretical analysis are the emphasis on 
formal structure; the attempt to generalize without first specifying in detail the facts to be 
generalized; and the failure to recognize that the ultimate test of the validity of a theory is 
not conformity to the canons of formal logic but the ability to deduce facts that have not yet 
been observed, that are capable of being contradicted by observation, and that subsequent 
observation does not contradict. In consequence, these defects are found in much economic 
theorizing that is not taxonomic in character. They are, however, especially likely to arise 
when the taxonomic approach is adopted, as their presence in the writings of so able and 
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Seven years later, Friedman published the most influential—and controversial—essay on economic 
methodology ever: “The Methodology of Positive Economics”. The essential distinguishing feature of 
F53 is the following test by implications: the only relevant test for the validity of an economic model 
is the comparison of its predictions with experience. In Friedman’s own words, “theory is to be 
judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to ‘explain’” (Friedman, 
1953, p. 8). What about the view that the conformity of the assumptions to reality is a valid test of a 
model different from or additional to the test by implications? “This widely held view is wrong and 
productive of much mischief” (Friedman, 1953, p. 14).
In a nutshell, according to F53 an economic model is to be judged by its predicted power, not by 
the “realism” of its assumptions. A corollary consistent with the methodology of F53 is that the real-
isticness of the assumptions in economics is immaterial to assess economic models. In at least this 
respect Friedman’s position is unique. Henceforth, this corollary will be called the Friedman tenet.
Most specialists in economic methodology have found that the methodology of economic theoriz-
ing presented by Friedman half a century ago is problematic. Methodological research has shown that 
the Friedman tenet is a very complex and highly ambiguous claim, and the methodology of F53 is 
therefore open to multiple interpretations. Indeed, it was clear after the publication of Mäki (1986) that 
there is no unambiguous doctrine presented in Friedman’s (1953) essay on economic methodology.
Summarizing the myriad of problems emerging from F53 would take us too far afield.3 We men-
tion only two competing interpretations. Boland (1979) claimed that Friedman was an instrumental-
ist, that is Friedman was not interested in the truth value of theories but more about their utility in 
devising solutions to practical problems. Mäki (1986) rejected Boland’s view that (1) there is just one 
coherent position in Friedman’s essay and (2) only an instrumentalist reading makes sense of it. 
More recently, Mäki (2009c) has “rewritten” Friedman’s (1953) essay in order to remove some unnec-
essary confusions and ambiguities. He has shown that F53 can be interpreted as a socially construc-
tivist fallibilist and realist statement—in contrast with the received instrumentalist interpretation 
(Mäki, 2009c).
Reading about methodological disputes in economics tends to be puzzling and frustrating for 
practising economists. In fact, sometimes it feels like grasping at air. As an illustration of this awk-
ward situation, consider a small sample of representative assessment of the economics discipline. 
Ronald Coase’s attack on what he called “blackboard economics” was that “What is studied is a sys-
tem which lives in the minds of the economists but not on earth. I have called the result ‘blackboard 
economics’” (Coase, 1992, p. 714). This appears to suggest that the problem with the economics 
discipline is that economics has ceased to make any claims about the economy. However, many 
economists, including Baumol (2000), Dasgupta (2002), Kreps (1997), and Solow (1997), claimed 
that economics has become more rather than less empirical. “The clear picture that emerges is that 
there is no clear picture” (Mäki, 2002b, p. 8).
We believe that the problem is not that economists have lost interest in real-world issues. On the 
contrary, practising economists today are more interested than ever in empirically understanding 
the real economy. The root problem lies in the formulation of assumptions which have no links with 
concrete facts, not the lack of connection of the model as a whole with the real world. It is always 
possible to make contact (perhaps arbitrarily) with the economic reality, even with a model which 
“lives in the minds of the economists but not on earth”.
There can be little doubt that F53 left the most important issue for practising economists and 
policy-makers unexplained. In fact, it is not clear what Friedman means by the term “unrealistic”. 
Sometimes he means “not descriptively complete”. At other times, he calls an assumption unrealis-
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is applied. There can be equally little doubt that, because of this unclarity, Friedman’s essay has led 
to a disquieting state of affairs. We all talk about the same thing, namely “unrealistic assumptions”, 
but we have not yet agreed what it is we are talking about.
The first time that Milton Friedman publicly commented about what others have written about his 
essay was after half a century of silence. Uskali Mäki invited Milton Friedman to a conference on his 
essay that was held at Erasmus University of Rotterdam in December 2003, but at the age of 91, 
Friedman decided not to travel. However, he agreed to write the final comment for the volume Mäki 
(2009a) upon having read the other contributions to the conference in question. Friedman’s final 
comment was laconic, to say the least (just one page!). His feelings were ambiguous:
I have somewhat mix feelings about the splendid conference that Uskali Mäki organized on 
my ancient methodology article. On the one hand, it is a source of great satisfaction that an 
article I wrote more than fifty years ago should still be regarded as worth extensive scholarly 
discussion. On the other hand, that very fact is a severe condemnation of the essay. Surely, 
if the essay had been really lucid, scholars should not today still be having different opinions 
about what it says. (Friedman, 2009, p. 355)
Inspection of the papers included in Mäki (2009a) confirms that a single coherent economic meth-
odology cannot be found in F53. Furthermore, Friedman’s beliefs and intentions were far from clear. 
In this connection, Mäki (2009b, p. 114) recognizes two possibilities: either Friedman did not have a 
coherent economic methodology in mind or he had a coherent methodology in mind but failed to 
convey it due to flaws in textual production. We will never know. What we do know, however, is that 
some economic theoreticians have interpreted the message of F53 as a maxim: “concerning the 
realism of the economic assumptions, anything goes”.
3. Fictional assumptions and surreal models
Without striving for philosophical rigour, we accept the intuitive idea about true/false statements. A 
statement is factually true if it stands in a suitable relation to the facts of the world. For example, 
Popp (2002) proves that the statement “environmental taxes and regulations not only reduce pollu-
tion by shifting behaviour away from polluting activities but also encourage the development of new 
technologies that make pollution control less costly in the long run” is true because it corresponds 
to the facts of the economy. A statement is said to be false if it is rejected by the empirical evidence. 
For example, Rabin and Vayanos (2010) point out that the statement “an absolutely random event 
cannot have a market for expert predictions” is generally false because the empirical evidence 
shows that some people are willing to pay for predictions of truly random outcomes.
Generally speaking, economic models provide generalizations about the real world. The art of eco-
nomic theorizing consists of both the formulation of assumptions and the articulation of those assump-
tions into a coherent model in order to gain an understanding of some aspects of the economy. 
There are no models without assumptions. Typically, the content of the economic assumptions involves 
attributes of markets (e.g. asymmetric information) and objectives of economic behaviour (e.g. prof-
it maximization) presumably displayed by (real) humans.
Economic theoreticians separate questions concerning their conceptual scheme from questions 
concerning the extent to which that conceptual scheme applies to the real world. As a result, there 
are two worlds for an economic theorist: the model world M (the imaginary world inside the model) 
and the real world R (the world outside the model). In so far as one is working within M, one can 
dismiss any questions about the realism of the assumptions one makes. There is nothing wrong in 
ignoring R in a fundamental way. An abstract theorist might be intrigued with a mathematical ques-
tion, such as the existence of rational expectations equilibrium or attempt to discredit certain assump-
tions by revealing the consequences of alternative assumptions. For example, one can attack the 
assumption of involuntary unemployment by assuming that the economy is always in equilibrium 
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However, a reasonable expectation is that someone somewhere somehow would be able to iden-
tify an acceptable connection between the crucial elements in M—including the content of the eco-
nomic assumptions—and some of the elements belonging to R. Developing credible knowledge in 
economics is not just discovering logical connections within M. An absolutely essential part of the 
economics discipline is the construction of models applicable to particular ensembles of agents, 
markets and institutions located in R.
The assumptions used to analyse a set of observed and related facts can be either true or false or 
exhibit truth value difficult to establish. In the study of the used car market, economists would not 
assume that information is symmetric (i.e. buyers and sellers have the same information). The assump-
tion is false, but the economic agents involved in the assumption can be reasonably connected with 
real humans. The assumption of profit-maximization in the used car market refers to the behaviour 
of sellers. The assumption may or may not be false, but it can be put in correspondence with sellers 
that exist in the world of experience. If necessary, the assumption of profit maximization can be 
paraphrased to determine the intended claim when making the assumption. For example, we can 
defend the reasonableness of this assumption by asserting that the mechanism of economic com-
petition ensures that only (real) firms displaying profit seeking behaviour can possibly survive.4
The methodology of positive economics accepts all sorts of assumptions, including preposterous 
assumptions. In fact, it follows from the Friedman tenet that even grotesquely unrealistic assump-
tions are just fine in so far as the models involving them perform well in predicting phenomena of 
interest. Many economists and non-economists consider the tenet itself grotesque, while others 
praise Milton Friedman for having formulated such a deep insight. It is clear that the snag lies in the 
practical difficulty of drawing a line where realism ends and unrealism begins. The present paper 
does not pursue the will-o’-the-wisp of defining the elusive notion of “unrealistic assumption”. 
Instead, a polar case of unrealisticness is brought into sharp focus.
In general, assumptions are used for making assertions or conjectures about the real world. They 
involve entities. An entity X is either an object (e.g. an oligopolistic market structure) or one or more 
attributes of human beings (e.g. rationality and profit-seeking behaviour). Often—though not always—
the entity X captures approximately the salient features of an empirical counterpart element that 
exists in R. For example, the attribute of financial literacy is attainable for many human beings, and 
an economic theoretician may formulate the assumption that “economic agents are financially lit-
erate” on the basis that the attribute is approximately exhibited by some residents in advanced 
economies such as Australia, Canada or the USA.
It is true that assumptions referring to attainable attributes can be extravagantly implausible, 
such as “all economic agents are financially literate in North Korea”. But it is true, also, that assump-
tions can refer to attributes that cannot be found in any human being, not even approximately. These 
assumptions are more than extravagantly implausible.
An obvious and not unimportant example is the assumption that the representative economic 
agent is omniscient (single mind assumption, for short). This assumption is an extreme and supreme 
example of unrealistic assumption for two reasons. First, all the existing information is concentrated 
in a single mind. And second, the single mind is capable of understanding all the implications emerg-
ing from the totality of information available in the economy.
Is the single mind assumption a negligibility assumption? In general, negligibility assumptions are 
statements about the fact of negligibility.5 If the purpose is to predict economic life, the discrepancy 
between the IQ of X (omniscient human being) and the IQs of real humans is not small enough to 
be neglected relative to this purpose. Claims about negligibility do not appear to be true because the 
difference between automatic understanding of any available information inherent to X and the 
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One thing is to say that an assumption is outrageously unrealistic because it omits major factors 
observable in R, such as assuming that “there are no transportation costs obstructing the free flow 
of international trade”. Quite a different thing is to assume the existence of entities that cannot pos-
sibly exist in R. For example, the assumption “teleportation of tangible products is possible”, postu-
lates the existence of an impossible phenomenon. Fictional assumptions refer to at least one entity 
X that is postulated in M but cannot possibly exist in R (at the time of formulating the assumption). 
As to the truth value of this special kind of assumption, one can make an intuitive point: they are 
false by definition. However, a different view is proffered by Uskali Mäki: a fictional assumption is 
factually neither true nor false because it is about nothing real (Mäki, 2002b, p. 9).6
A model containing at least one fictional assumption is termed surreal model. Models involving 
omniscient economic agents are surreal. Such model building does not presuppose that one believes 
that a particular fictional assumption is of any use in understanding R. It is impossible to make mean-
ingful contact between the world postulated in a surreal model and the real world because the fic-
tional assumptions located in M contain entities that cannot possibly exist in R. This sort of intellectual 
construct fits nicely with the notion of “conceptual explorations”, which investigate the internal 
properties of the models without considering the relationship between M and R (Hausman, 1992).
It should be clear, however, that conceptual explorations need not be based on surreal models. It 
should also be clear that knowledge based on surreal models may provoke the sort of academic 
mirage identified by Hayek (1974) as the “pretence-of-knowledge” syndrome. In his Nobel-prize accept-
ance lecture, Hayek (1974) writes: “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and power 
which enable us to shape the process of society entirely to our linking, knowledge which in fact we 
do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm”.
One reading of Hayek’s “pretence-of-knowledge” syndrome is as a reminder of the dangers of 
believing that knowledge emerging from surreal models provides trustworthy knowledge about R. 
For example, one could develop a surreal model-based teleportation of humans, animals and mate-
rials, and show that there exists a first best geographical distribution of resources on Earth. Few 
people would deny that to act on the belief that humans can shape the global economy to attain an 
ideal distribution of resources in R using the alluded surreal model is pretence-of-knowledge.
To sum up, there is an extreme and supreme (proper) subset of unrealistic assumption repre-
sented by all the suppositions involving the existence of at least one entity X which cannot possibly 
exist in the real world. The intuition behind the notion of fictional assumption can be highlighted as 
follows. What is the difference between the following two assumptions in terms of existence in the 
real world: the single mind assumption and “crocodiles have feathers?” None. The entities referred 
in these assumptions do not exist. It seems reasonable to identify the class of economic models involv-
ing fictional assumptions as the set of surreal models.
4. The inconvenient theorem: proof and illustration
The Friedman tenet was formulated more than half a century ago, but it remains as topical as ever: 
it is repeatedly invoked by some—but not all—economic theoreticians, probably because it leaves 
the set of acceptable assumptions unbounded. Notwithstanding, many practising economists take 
it as obvious that a discipline revolving around highly unrealistic assumptions is of dubious scientific 
value.
Friedman’s (1953) essay is a kaleidoscopic work. It is not the purpose of this paper to provide an 
alternative interpretation of the Friedman’s economic methodology. We only make two points about 
the Friedman tenet that come very naturally, indeed: (1) the tenet does not rule out an overly extreme 
position on the realism of the assumptions represented by the use of fictional assumptions in model 
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What, if anything, can we say about the acceptance of fictional assumptions in economics? It is 
possible to show that one inevitable conclusion follows: the methodology of positive economics 
does not exclude science fiction. To our knowledge, this had not been previously enunciated in the 
economic literature, and for lack of a better name, we will refer to it as the Inconvenient Theorem.
One can confirm the logical compulsion of the Inconvenient Theorem straightaway. On the one 
hand, the methodology of positive economics does not prohibit the use of fictional assumptions in 
model building. On the other hand, the essential distinguishing feature of science fiction is a narra-
tive based on fictional assumptions. Therefore, the intersection between economics and science 
fiction is not empty. To rule out the point of contact between economics and science fiction, eco-
nomic theorists have no choice: they have to avoid fictional assumptions. The solution is obvious 
from common sense.
An illustration of the Inconvenient Theorem immediately suggests itself. It is based on the rational 
expectations assumption (REA), that is the assumption that people should correctly understand the 
economic model and be able to form correct predictions from it about future outcomes.7 Many econ-
omists believe that, while intricate and sophisticated, the REA is irrelevant to the real world.
The REA was an innovation in model building introduced by Muth (1961). It took 10 years before 
economists began to use this innovation. The first important paper in which Robert Lucas Jr. used 
rational expectations was written jointly with Edward Prescott (Lucas & Prescott, 1971). A few years 
later, there was an explosion of articles on rational expectations.
The implications of the REA include: expectations are uniform, all economic agents are identical, 
markets play no role as information-processing entities and economic agents do not innovate (and 
never will). In particular, the REA disregards the interactions of real humans, each of whom pos-
sesses only partial information and limited capacity of understanding.
Criticisms on the rational expectations approach are not new. It is no exaggeration to say that 
Hayek (1945) criticized the REA before it was formulated. Notably, Arrow (1978) and Tobin (1980) 
launched severe attacks on the rational expectations approach. Despite the authority of both Arrow 
and Tobin and the common sense nature of their criticisms, the rational expectations approach was 
the dominant paradigm until the financial crisis 2007–2008.
The intuition behind the basic postulate of the rational expectations theorists seems to be logi-
cally impeccable: rational people with the same information are bound to come to the same conclu-
sion. There is, however, a disquieting snag in this intuition: the postulate reduces the problem of 
understanding to one of information. But having information is one thing, understanding what it 
means is quite another.
Information is not given to anyone in its totality and automatic understanding of the massive 
amount of information in the real world is out of the question. It would hardly be necessary to point 
out that the REA assumption implies the single mind assumption. This fictional limiting case should 
be carefully distinguished from non-fictional limiting cases, such as perishable goods thought of as 
limiting form of durable goods with high depreciation rates. Both perishable goods and durable 
goods exist in the real economy, but human beings with the capacity of automatic understanding of 
the content and implications of all the available information cannot be found on our planet.
The magic incantation of rational expectations (a fictional assumption par excellence) appeared 
to have engendered a misleading mirage embraced by the economics profession before the finan-
cial crisis 2007–2008. “Freshwater” economists such as Robert Lucas Jr. and Edward Prescott, mis-

































Page 9 of 13
Pol, Cogent Economics & Finance (2015), 3: 1054142
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2015.1054142
individuals interact in perfect markets. This point was forcibly made by Krugman (2009): “As I see it, 
the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impres-
sive-looking mathematics, for truth.”
The current core of macroeconomics—in essence, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) approach—has been the target of harsh criticism because of its fictional content. The artifi-
cial reality described by the DSGE model revolves around the REA. Caballero (2010) has expressed 
that the use of the DSGE approach “is dangerous for both methodological and policy reasons”. In 
particular, Caballero (2010) indicates that the intersection between the artificial world of the core of 
macroeconomics and the real world is empty: the DSGE model “speaks of no particular real-world 
issue with any reliability”. Furthermore, he points out that refining the REA is like taking a shortcut 
through quick sand:
(…) We are digging ourselves, one step at a time, deeper and deeper into Fantasyland, with 
economic agents who can solve richer and richer stochastic general equilibrium problems 
containing all sorts of frictions. Because the “progress” is gradual, we do not seem to 
notice as we accept what are increasingly absurd behavioural conventions and stretch the 
intelligence and information of underlying economic agents to levels that render them 
unrecognizable. (Caballero, 2010, p. 90)
It goes without saying that the Inconvenient Theorem is a positive statement, in the sense that it is 
not a conclusion as to whether the Friedman tenet is bad or good. Having said this, it is undeniable 
that the Inconvenient Theorem throws a wrench into the design of economic policy based on surreal 
economic models. Economics consists not only of model building to understand R, but also offering 
models that enable prediction and control of real phenomena. Surreal economic models may allow 
economic theoreticians to escape from the “mess” of reality. But these models display an unin-
tended consequence: they are an integral part of science fiction. This prompts the riddle of the fic-
tional assumptions: Are surreal models acceptable as a guide for policy design? The answer is 
particularly important for both practising economists and policy makers.
Why do economists give conflicting advice to policy-makers? One possible reason—but obviously 
not the only one—is that economists disagree on the validity of alternative models about how the 
world works. In particular, rational expectations economists condone the use of models postulating 
economic agents that do not exist even approximately in R for policy guidance, while others such as 
Tobin (1980) and Caballero (2010) perceive surreal models as being dangerous for policy design.
An affirmative answer to the riddle is not free of difficulties. To see this, consider two completely 
different but important questions that both Robert Lucas Jr. and Stephen Hawking would answer in 
the affirmative. First, is prediction of economic life possible within the rational expectations para-
digm? According to Lucas (1995) the answer to this question is “Yes”, if the idealized economy is 
populated by super-rational economic agents. Lucas would remain silent about the existence of 
super-humans, or perhaps he would say “It’s all as if.” Second, is time travel to the future possible 
within the laws of nature? According to Hawking (2010) the answer is “Yes,” if we use the super-fast 
train.
What do the Lucas super-rational economic agent and the Hawking super-fast train have in com-
mon? Neither the rational expectations actor nor the super-fast train exists in the real world. 
However, Stephen Hawking differs from rational expectations theorists, in that Hawking does not 
use the implications of his artificial reality to provide policy guidance to space agencies, but the rational 
expectations economists often used their surreal models to inform central banks and promote the 
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5. The strong version of the www constraint
What makes knowledge in economics credible? To achieve credible knowledge, one can seek con-
sistency between the model and the functioning of the world by designing specific rules of coher-
ence between M and R. We believe that the criterion introduced by Mäki (2001), namely the way the 
world works constraint (or www constraint, for short) provides an important test for credible knowl-
edge in economics. The www constraint is based on four premises that can be paraphrased as 
follows:
    C1. Economists pursue comprehension of the economy;
        C2. Comprehending the economy means to understand how the economy works;
        C3. The economy’s workings are a matter of causal processes being in place; and
        C4. Comprehension of the economy is sought by means of models.
For reasons that will become apparent in a moment, we call this (original) version of the www con-
straint “weak www constraint”.
An obvious question arising is: Does the www constraint exclude science fiction? There is an ele-
ment of indecisiveness inherent to the weak version of the www constraint. The constraint typically 
plays the role of a weaker exclusion device, in that it helps to exclude model candidates which depicts 
R “in such a way that we have reason to believe that the world does not function that way, or, more 
strongly, that it cannot function that way, or, still more strongly, that it cannot function at all, given 
what we know about it” (Mäki, 2001, p. 385, [italics in original]).
But the weak www constraint remains silent about surreal models. In order to guarantee an emp-
ty intersection between economics and science fiction, a stronger version of the www constraint is 
needed. A stronger version of the www constraint would impose an additional condition to the pre-
ceding four premises. The additional constraint can be stated as follows:
  C5. To avoid a point of contact between the economics discipline and science fiction, surreal              
economic models have to be excluded from economics.
The fact that we have proven the Inconvenient Theorem does not imply that we are decrying the 
importance of, or indeed the eventual necessity for, fictional assumptions in economics. It simply 
supports the view that economics models require scrutiny based on the strong version of the www 
constraint if they are going to be used to inform economic policy.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
Many economic theoreticians have found the message of Friedman’s (1953) essay liberating because 
his methodology does not impose constraints on the realism of economic assumptions. Perceptions 
have been sharply divided on the impact of the famous Friedman’s (1953) methodological essay on 
the progress of economics as a scientific discipline. Some economists view economics as a scientific 
success thanks to its adherence to the Friedman tenet while others see this tenet as a retardatory 
factor. Beyond any doubt, one peculiar source of controversy and confusion has been the lack of an 
unambiguous working definition of the term “unrealistic assumption” combined with Friedman’s 
attitude of not publicly addressing the criticisms of his essay.
After half a century of the publication of his essay, Friedman wrote: “I have myself added to the 
confusion by early on adopting a policy of not replying to critiques of the article” (Friedman, 2009, 
p. 355). Or, to put it differently, Milton Friedman did not feel under obligation of publicly addressing 
the comments and criticisms on his 1953 essay and decided to stick to his “no reply” rule. As a result, 
the most important essay of economic methodology of the twentieth century will live its own life 
forever. In particular, this means that we will never know whether Friedman would have accepted 
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This paper has been devoted to an exposition and elaboration of a single syllogism: given that 
fictional assumptions are allowed by the Friedman tenet, and that the defining characteristic of sci-
ence fiction is the existence of at least one fictional assumption, it follows that science fiction cannot 
be ruled out from positive economics. More precisely, positive economics and science fiction overlap 
but are not identical.
The most obvious illustration of the Inconvenient Theorem is given by any model which involves 
the REA in a fundamental way. Underlying the REA is the postulate of automatic comprehension: the 
availability of information automatically implies the understanding of the information. This compel-
ling point—obvious, but often forgotten—is a non-sequitur. In a nutshell, when abstraction is used 
to postulate economic agents that are super-humans, as in the single mind assumption, we enter in 
the domain of sciencefiction.
The message conveyed by this paper is clear: there is no constraint inherent to the Friedman tenet 
that prevents economics from entering into the realm of science fiction or leading some parts of 
economics into Hayek’s pretence-of-knowledge syndrome. What may not be as obvious is that the 
Friedman tenet throws a wrench on policy design. In fact, the riddle of the fictional assumptions—
i.e. is the use of surreal models acceptable for policy design?—cannot be easily overlooked. One way 
to exclude science fiction from the economics discourse is to use the strong version of the www 
constraint.
We believe that economics is a scientific discipline—meaning by the term “scientific”, a body of 
propositions based on assumptions that are derived from empirical observation, and both the assump-
tions and the predictions are capable of verification. Criticism is an integral part of scientific activity 
and the efforts for challenging assumptions are necessary for scientific progress in economics. 
Assumptions are not impenetrable black boxes. We gain further understanding of the possibilities 
and limitations of the assumptions by critically evaluating their contents and implications.
We also believe that surreal models should not be taken seriously as guides to policy. Otherwise, 
economists would be accepting science fiction as a valid tool for applied economic analysis. As for 
those who argue that surreal models are useful to inform policy, we may leave them the task of 
proving their case.
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Notes
1. The terms “realism” and “unrealistic assumption” are 
not defined in F53. Friedman uses a variety of terms 
to refer to the idea of unrealistic assumptions, such 
as “descriptively inaccurate” and “descriptively false” 
(Friedman, 1953, p. 14). These expressions are not char-
acterized other than through examples. The examples, 
in turn, are not free of ambiguities.
2. A terminological digression is pertinent here. Professor 
Uskali Mäki has stressed the importance of distinguish-
ing between “Friedman’s methodology” and the “meth-
odology of F53” to avoid confusion: “Indeed, Friedman’s 
methodology and the methodology of F53 are not one 
and the same thing, even though the two are likely to 
be connected” (Mäki, 2009b, p. 52 [Italics in original]). 
From now on, we confine attention to the methodology 
of F53.
3. A road map (in chronological order) for readers that 
wish to enter the labyrinth engendered by the multiple 
evaluations of the methodology of positive economics is 
as follows: Rotwein (1959), Nagel (1963), Melitz (1965), 
Boland (1979), Mäki (1986, 1992, 2002b, 2009b).
4. “Paraphrasing” is not the “open sesame” to justify the 
reasonableness of any assumption. There are limits 
to the art of paraphrase. A general principle has been 
suggested by Uskali Mäki: “a paraphrase can be used to 
justify a sentence if it transforms the sentence into a 
statement that involves factual claims about the domain 
of study”. (Mäki, 2000, p. 332 [Italics in original])
5. For a precise definition of “negligibility assumption”, (see 
Mäki, 2000, p. 322).
6. For the purposes of the present paper, these differing 
views are immaterial.
7. A stronger version consists of assuming that people 
have probability beliefs that coincide with the probabili-
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